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FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1976

STATEMENT
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

10:00 A.M.

THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1976
DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to testify in support of
S. 3197, a bill that would authorize applications for court
orders approving the use of electronic surveillance to obtain
foreign intelligence information.

I want to express, as I have

in my previous testimony on the bill, the great significance
which I believe the bill to have.

As I am sure you know, the

bill's provisions have evolved, from the initiative of the
President, through bipartisan cooperation and through discussion
between the Executive Branch and r1embers of Congress, in an effort
to identify and serve the public interest.

Enactment of the bill

will, I believe, provide major assurance to the public that
electronic surveillance will be used in the United States for
foreign intelligence purposes pursuant to carefully drawn legis
lative standards and procedures.
for official action.

The bill ensures accountability

It compels the Executive to scrutinize such

action at regular intervals.

And it requires independent review

at a critical point by a detached and neutral magistrate.
In providing statutory standards and procedures to govern
the use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
in this country and in establishing critical safeguards to protect
individual rights, the bill also ensures that the Pre:sident will
be able to obtain information essential to protection of the
Nation against foreign threats.

While gua.rding against abuses in

the future, it succeeds, I trust, in avoiding the kind of

reaction against abuses of the past that focuses solely on these
abuses, but is careless of other compelling interests. To go in that
direction would bring a new instability and peril.

In the area of foreign

intelligence, the avoidance of such cycles of reaction is the
special responsibility of this Committee.

I know you are

deeply conscious of this responsibility; I know you are aware
that it demands the most dispassionate attention, the most
scrupulous care.
I believe that I can best serve the Committee's consideration
of the bill by addressing certain concerns about its central
provis ions tha t I know have been
expressed.

At the outset, however, it may he useful for me

to describe, in briefest form, the bill's design and purpose.
S.3197 provides for the designation by the Chief Justice
of seven district court judges, to whom the Attorney General, if
he is authorized by the President to do so, may make application
for an order approving electronic surveillance within the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes.

The judge may grant

such an order only if he finds that there is probable cause to
believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power, and if a Presidential appointee
confirmed by the Senate has certified that the information
sought is indeed foreign intelligence information that cannot
feasibly be obtained by less intrusive techniques.

Such surveillances

may not continue longer than 90 days without securing renewed
approval from the court.

There is an emergency provision in the bill

which is available in situations in which there is no possibility of

preparing the necessary papers for the court's review in time
to obtain the information sought in the surveillance.

In such

circumstances the Attorney General may authorize the use of
electronic surveillance for a period of no more than 24 hours.
The Attorney General would be required to notify a judge at
the time of the authorization that such a decision has been
made and to submit an application to the judge within 24 hours.
Finally, the Attorney General must report annually both to the
Congress and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts statistics on electronic surveillance pursuant to the
bill's procedures.
As I said in my statement to the Senate and House Judiciary
Subcommittees, the standards and procedures of the proposed
bill are not a response to a presumed constitutional warrant
requirement applicable to domestic surveillances conducted for
foreign intelligence purposes.

Two circuit courts have held

that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply
to this area; the Supreme Court in the Keith case, and the
District of Columbia Circuit in its Zweibon decision. despite
broad dicta among its several opinions, have specifically
reserved the question.

The bill responds then, not to constitutional

necessity, but to the need for the branches of Government to
work together to overcome the fragmentation of the present
law among the areas of legislation. judicial d'ecisions. and
administrative action. and to achieve the coherence. stability
and clarity in the law and practice that alone can assure
necessary protection of the Nation's safety and of individual
rights.

After thirty-six years in which succeeding Presidents

have thought some use of this technique was essential, I
believe the time has come wnen Congress and the
Executive together can take

much~needed

steps to give clarity

and coherence to a great part of the law in this area, the
part of the law that concerns domestic electronic surveillance
of foreign powers and their agents for foreign intelligence
purposes.

To bring greater coherence to this field, one must,

of course, build on the thoughts and experiences of the past; to
give reasonable recognition, as the judicial decisions in
general have done, to the confidentiality, judgments and dis
cretion that the President's constitutional responsibilities
require; to give legislative form to the standards and procedures
that experience suggests, and to provide added assurance by
adapting a judicial warrant procedure to the unique charac
teristics of this area.
The standards and procedures contained in the bill,
particularly its provision for prior judicial approval, draw
upon the traditional criminal law enforcement search warrant
model, the pattern followed in Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The bill's provisions

necessarily reflect, however, 'the distinct national interest
that foreign intelligence surveillances are intended to serve
The primary purpose of such surveillances is not to obtain
evidence for criminal prosecution, although that may be the
result in some cases.

The purpose, instead, is to obtain

information concerning the ac.tions of for'eign powers and their
agents in this country--information that may often be critical
to the protection of the Nation from foreign threats. But while the

departures from the criminal law enforcement model reflect
this distinct national interest,

they are

limited so that there are safeguards for individual rights
which do not now exist in statutory form.

The bill is based

on a belief that it is possible to achieve an accommodation
that both protects individual rights and allows the obtaining
of information necessary to the Nation's safety.
Powell said in the Keith case:

As Justice

"Different standards may be

compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable
both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens.

For the warrant application may vary according to

the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of
citizen rights deserving protection."
The bill allows foreign intelligence surveillance only
of persons who there is probable cause to believe are agents
of a foreign power.

Moreover, the agency must be of a

particular kind. directly related to the kinds of foreign
power activities in which the Government has a legitimate
foreign intelligence interest.

Thus, persons--not citizens

or resident aliens--are deemed agents only if they are
officers or employees of a foreign power.

The standard is

much higher for a citizen or resident alien.

For the purpose

of this bill. a citizen or resident alien' can be found to be
an agent only if there is probable cause to believe that the
person is acting Hpursuant to the direction of a foreign
power. It and Itis engaged in clandestine intelligence activities.

sabotage, or terrorist activities, or who conspires with, or
knowingly aids or abets such a person in engaging in such
activities."

Perhaps I should say to the committee that an

earlier draft of the bill was not phrased in terms of clandestine
intelligence activities, but rather in terms of the somewhat
simpler term "spying. 11

Whatever phrase is used, in combination

with the clause "pursuant to the direction of a foreign power",
is intended to convey the requirement that there is probable
cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is indeed
a secret agent who operates as part of the foreign intelligence
network of a foreign power.

It is at this crucial point that

the judge must be satisfied before he gives permission for the
surveillance.
I understand that there have been suggestions to the
Committee that electronic surveillance of citizens and permanent
resident aliens should not be allowed absent a determination
that such persons are violating federal law.

My own view is

that the concept of "foreign agent" safely cannot be limited
in this way.

As I noted in a letter to Senator Kennedy, most

of the activities that would, under the bill, allow surveillance
of citizens and resident aliens, constitute federal crimes;
other foreign agent activities -- for

exa~ple,

foreign espionage

to acquire technical data about industrial processes or knowledge
about foreign personnel and facilities in this country -- do not
constitute federal crimes.

Yet information about the latter

activities may be vital to the national interest, not because

the activities are or should be criminal, but because they
are undertaken clandestinely within the United States "pursuant
to the direction of a foreign power," the standard employed
in the bill.
The point is critical.

I realize it has been

suggested that federal criminal statutes could be broadened
sufficiently to reach all clandestine 'activities of foreign
agents covered by the bill's standard.
would in no way limit the bill's reach.

Of course doing so
More important, any

such effort would be based on a fundamental misconception.
The purpose of criminalization, and of prosecutions for crime,
is to deter certain activities deemed contrary to the public
interest.

The ·purpose of foreign intelligence surveillances

is, of course, to gain information about the activities of
foreign agents, not so much because those activities are
dangerous in themselves -- although they almost always are
but because they provide knowledge about the hostile actions
and intentions and capabilities of foreign powers, knowledge
vital to the safety of the Nation.

Indeed, it may be the

case, and has been the case on occasions in the past, that
such knowledge, provided through monitoring foreign agent
activities, is more vital to the Nation's safety than preventing

or deterring the activities through criminal prosecutions.
In short, the question, for purposes of properly limiting
foreign intelligence surveillances, is not whether activities
of foreign agents are now, or should be made, criminal
offenses, but rather whether the activities are such that
knowledge of them, gained through carefully restricted and
controlled means, is essential to protection from foreign
threats.

While the answers to these two questions have a

high correlation, the correlation is by no means necessarily
complete.
I know that a certain discomfort comes in departing
from the criminal law model of allowing searches only to
obtain evidence of crime.

But the probable cause and

reasonableness standards of the Fourth Amendment are not
measured exclusively by the interest in detecting and thus
deterring violations·of criminal law.

Searches for purposes

other than criminal law enforcement historically have been
permissible, if reasonable in light of the circumstances
and the governmental interest involved.
the activities of foreign agents engaged

Information concerning

in intelligence, espionage or sabotage activities is a valid-
indeed a vital Government interest.

I believe that that

'interest should be the proper standard of permissible
surveillances under this legislation.
In addition to requiring that there be probable cause to
believe that the subject of proposed surveillance is an agent
of a foreign power, the bill also provides that the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs or another appropriate
Executive official appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate must certify to the court that the information sought
and described in the application is foreign intelligence
information,

Such information is defined in the bill as

"information deemed necessary to the ability of the United States
to protect itself against actual or potential attack or other
hostile acts of a foreign power or its agents l ' ; Hinformation,
with respect to foreign powers or territories, which because
of its importance is deemed essential to (a) the security or
national defense of the Nation or (b) to the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States"; or "information deemed
necessary to the ability of the United States to protect the
national security against foreign intelligence activities."
I understand it has been suggested to the Committee that
the court, in passing on applications for electronic surveillances,
should be required to determine whether the information sought
is foreign intelligence information as defined in the bill,
rather than accepting the'certification to that effect by a
high Presidential appointee with national security responsibilities

I think the definition of "foreign intelligence information" contained
in the bill itself indicates why this proposal would be unwise.

The

determination of whether information is or is not foreign intelligence
information necessarily will require the exercise of judgment as to
degree of importance and need--judgment that must be informed by
the most precise knowledge of national defense and foreign relations
problems. and accurate perception of legitimate national security
needs.

Unless judges are to be given a continuing responsibility of

an Executive type, with constant access to the range of information
necessary, under the proposa1,to deal intelligently with the
questions they would face. I doubt that the courts generally would
be willing to substitute their judgments for those which the
Executive already has made.

Of course, if mistakes are made,

the costs could be incalculable.

It must be noted in this

connection that. in major part, it was precisely the felt incapacity
of the courts to make judgments of this sort, and recognition
that responsibility for such judgments properly resides in the
Executive, that led the Fifth Circuit in Brown and the Third
Circuit in Butenko to conclude that the Fourth Amendment
imposes no warrant requirement in this area.

Indeed. the

proposal could work a result quite the reverse of what its
proponents would want.
proposing

surveillance

There would be a certain ease in

if the responsibility for determining its need lay ultimately
with the court.
The point cannot be stressed too strongly.

As it now

stands, the bill places the responsibility for determining need
where it be1ongs--in those officials who have the knowledge,
experience, and responsibility to make the judgment, and who
have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
to aid in carrying out his constitutional duty to protect the
Nation against foreign threats.

With such responsibility clearly

placed, there comes, in the long term at least, accountability-
to the President,of course, but ultimately to the Congress,
and to the people.

I believe that this protection provided by

clearly focused responsibility, when coupled with the probable
cause requirement of the bill, a requirement that demands a kind
of judgment the courts can responsibly make, ensures reasonable
and certain barriers to abuse.
Finally, I want to express my understanding of the bill's
section 2528, which deals with the reservation of Presidential
Power.

The bill's definition of electronic surveillance limits

its scope, to gain foreign intelligence information when the
target is a foreign power or its agents, to interceptions within
the United States.

The bill does not purport to cover inter

ceptions of all international communications where, for example,
the interception would be accomplished

out~ide

of the United

States, or, to take another example, a radio transmission does
not have both the sender and all intended recipients within the
United States.

Interception of international communications,

beyond those covered in the bill, involves special problems
and circumstances that do not fit the analysis and system this
bill would impose.

This is not to say that the development of

legislative safeguards in the international communications area
is impossible.

I know it will be extremely difficult and will

involve different considerations.

I believe it will be

unfortunate, therefore, to delay the creation of safeguards
in the area with which this bill deals until the attempt is
made to cover what is essentially a different area with
different problems.

An additional reason for the reservation of

Presidential power is that. even in the area covered by the bill,
it is conceivable that there may be unprecedented, unforeseen
circumstances of the utmost danger not contemplated in the
legislation in which restrictions unintentionally would bring
paralysis where all would regard action as imperative.

The

Presidential power provision, therefore. simply makes clear
that the bill was not intended to affect Presidential powers in
areas beyond its scope. including areas which. because of utmost
danger. were not contemplated by Congress in its enactment.
In the reservation of Presidential power, where the circumstances
are beyond the scope or events contemplated in the bill, the
bill in no way expands or contracts, confirms or denies, the
President's constitutional powers.

As the Supreme Court said

of Section 2511 (3) of Title III. "Congress simply left
Presidential powers where it found them."

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the critical
safeguards the bill would erect:

clear accountability

for official action, scrutiny of the action by Executive
officials at regular intervals and prior, independent
judgment, as provided, by a detached, neutral magistrate.
I believe that the bill's enactment would be a significant
accomplishment in the service of the liberty and security
of our people.

